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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
The Respondent agrees with the Appellant's Statement of the Nature of the Case

(Ap. Br. p. 1,1/ A) with one minor clarification. The discipline imposed on Mr. Duncan was for
violating the State of Idaho Accounting Rule 4.01 (IDAPA 01.01.01.004.01)' which incorporates
by reference the standards of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
("AICPA")? including AICPA Rule 102.3 (also referred to as Rule 102.03). The discipline
consisted of a written reprimand, a requirement to take four hours of ethics in a Continuing
Professional Education course, an administrative penalty of $1,000 and reimbursement of costs
of up to $2,000. (Clerk's Record p. 13.)

B.

Course of Proceedings.
The Respondent adds the following information to the Appellant's section on the

Course of Proceedings. After the hearing before the entire Idaho State Board of Accountancy
("Board") on July 18,2007, it issued its decision. The entire Board agreed with the findings
contained in the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order issued by the Board and signed
by its Chair Lisa L. Donnelly on August 16,2007.

' IDAPA is the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act.
AICPA is the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. There is an ISCPA Idaho Society of CPAs. Unlike the integrated Bar that governs the admissions and discipline of
Idaho lawyers as well as serving as the professional organization of lawyers, those two hnctions
are separated in the Accountancy profession. The Idaho State Board of Accountancy is
responsible for the process of testing, licensing and discipline.

The Appellant then filed a Petition for Judicial Review. The matter was fully
briefed and argued before the Honorable Carl B. Kenick, District Judge, on July 15,2008. On
September 3,2008, Judge Kenick entered an Order denying Appellant's Motion to Dismiss and
affirming the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order issued by the Idaho State Board of
Accountancy. The Appellant has appealed the district court's affirmation of the Board's
decision.
C.

Concise Statement of the Pacts.

The Respondent agrees that the pertinent facts presented by Appellant as being
"undisputed and uncontroverted" are accurate. However, there are a number of facts germane to
the issues of the case which are not included.
The following undisputed facts (with references to the record) were not contained
in the Appellant's recitation and are germane to the Board's Order, the district court's decision
and the consideration of this Court:
Mr. Duncan admits that a conflict of interest regarding Mr. Forsmann
arose as soon as he recommended counsel to Mrs. Forsmann in May 2004. (Transcript3pp. 8-9,
28.)
The personal relationship between Mr. Duncan and Mrs. Forsmann
developed in May, 2004, before she filed for a divorce. (Transcript pp. 8-9.)

Transcript refers to the transcript of the hearing before the Idaho State Board of
Accountancy. It is contained as an exhibit in the Clerk's Record. The page numbers referred to
are the page numbers of the exhibit.

Mr. Duncan admits that he did not tell Mr. Forsmann that there was a
conflict at either time or any time thereafter. (Transcript pp. 8-9,28.)
Mr. Duncan was the supervisor for the Forsmann account whether he did
the actual work or not. (Transcript pp. 9,24.)
8

The personal relationship between Mr. Duncan and Evelyn Forsmann

between May and September 2004 consisted at least of her visiting his home with her family, her
calling him on the telephone at least 500 times between May 1 and mid-August, "dating" after
the divorce was final in August, and a joint vacation in August 2004. (Transcript pp. 11, 14-15,
20.) Mr. Duncan did not discuss any of these contacts with Mr. Forsmann. (Transcript p. 30.)
The earliest that the evidence at the hearing shows that Mr. Forsmann
knew of the relationship between Evelyn Forsmann and Michael Duncan was late July 2004, and
perhaps not until August 18,2004. (Transcript p. 30.)
8

Mr. Duncan continued to retain responsibility for the filing of joint tax

returns. Finding of Fact #3, even though no active work was being done on the returns.

11.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Although the Appellant makes passing reference to the issue, a significant issue
for the Court to consider on appeal is the scope of review. As an administrative agency the
decision of the Idaho State Board of Accountancy is to be given deference pursuant to Idaho
Code Sections 67-5270.67-5279 and case law cited fnrther in this brief.

111.
ARGUMENT
A.

Introduction.
The Idaho State Board of Accountancy is charged in Chapter 2 of Title 54 of the

Idaho Code with prescribing and assessing the qualifications and regulating the conduct of
licensees. IDAHO
CODE3 54-202. To facilitate that responsibility the Board is empowered to:
Adopt and amend rules . . . including but not limited to:

*

*

*

(d)

Rules of professional conduct directed lo controlling the
quality and probity of professional services by licensees,
and dealing among other things with independence,
integrity and objectivity; competence and technical
standards; responsibilities to the public; and responsibilities
to clients;

(e)

Rules governing the professional standards applicable to
licensees.

(Emphasis added.)
The Board takes its legislative mandate very seriously. It is important for many
reasons, including public confidence in the accuracy of documents prepared and reviewed by
CPAs and public confidence in the integrity of the profession, that the Board guard the
profession's independence, integrity and objectivity. And it is imperative that the Board take
appropriate steps within the bounds of due process to assure that such rules are adopted and
enforced.
One of the manifestations that a CPA has maintained his or her independence,
integrity and objectivity is that the CPA avoid conflicts of interest. AICPA Rule 102.01 states:

Integrity and Objectivity - In the performance of any
professional service, a member shall maintain objectivity and
integrity, shall be free of conflicts of interest, and shall not
knowingly misrepresent facts or subordinate his or her judgment to
others.
B.

Standard of Review.

Challenging an administrative order under the Idaho Administrative Procedure
Act ("IDAPA") is generally a two-step process. See, e.g., Barron v. Idaho Dep 't of Water Res.,
135 Idaho 414,417, 18 P.3d 219,222 (2001). First, the Appellant must demonstrate the agency
violated a standard in Idaho Code Section 67-5279(3):
When the agency was required by the provisions of
(3)
this chapter or by other provisions of law to issue an order, the
court shall affirm the agency action unless the court finds that the
agency's findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(a)

in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(b)

in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(c)

made upon unlawkl procedure;

not supported by substantial evidence on the record
(d)
as a whole; or
(e)

5 67-5279(3)

~ A H CODE
O

arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
(emphasis added). Second, the Appellant must demonstrate that

substantial rights of the Appellant have been prejudiced by the agency action. IDAHOCODE5 675279(4) ;see Barron, 135 Idaho at 417, 18 P.3d at 222. In this case, the Appellant raises only
(d) and (e). Therefore, the agency's findings must be affirmed unless the findings are not
supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole or the findings are arbitrary,

capricious, or an abuse of discretion. IDAHO
CODE8 67-5279(3)(d)(e). Substantial evidence is
more than a scintilla of proof, but less than a preponderance. Boley v. State, Indus. Special
Indem. Fund, 130 Idaho 278,280,939 P.2d 854,856 (1997). Thus, the burden is on Mr. Duncan
to show that there is not substantial evidence in this record to support the Board's order or he
must show that the findings of the Board are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. He
has not met either burden. In addition, there must be a showing that the Appellant's substantial
rights were prejudiced. Since no action was taken against his license, there is no showing that
meets this requirement.
The Board will discuss in the next section the evidence which supports its
decision. Regarding the position taken by the Appellant that the Board's decision was arbitrary,
capricious or an abuse of discretion, Mr. Duncan's argument essentially is that the Board
misinterpreted the relevant Rule. That Rule, the law governing the interpretation of statutes (and
rules) and case law regarding an administrative body's decisions are discussed in the remainder
of this brief.
C.

Appellant Violated AICPA Rule 102.3.
1.

The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA")
publishes the Code of Professional Conduct and Bylaws4

AICPA Section 102 sets forth the rules relating to integrity and objectivity.
Rule 102.3 defines "Conflicts of Interest" as follows:

The AICPA Code of Professional Conduct is incorporated by reference into the Rules of
the Board of Accountancy, Idaho Code Section 54-204(1)(i) and IDAPA 01.01.01.004.01.

A conflict of interest may occur if a member performs a
professional service for a client or employer and the member or his
or her firm has a relationship with anotherperson, entity,
product, or service that could, in the member's professional
judgment, be viewed by the client, employer, or other appropriate
parties as impairing the member's objectivity. If the member
believes that the professional service can be performed with
objectivity, and the relationship is disclosed to and consent is
obtainedfrom such client, employer, or other appropriate parties,
the rule shall not operate to prohibit the performance of the
professional service. When making the disclosure, the member
should consider Rule 301.
AICPA Rule 102.3 (emphasis added).
2.

The Law Relating to Construction and Interpretation of Rules
Supports the Board's Decision.

The Idaho State Board of Accountancy has incorporated the rules of the AICPA
into its Accountancy Rules in Rule 004.01 (4.01).' That includes AICPA Rule 102.03 which
then becomes a rule of the ISBOA. The Appellant has challenged the Board's interpretation of
that rule. A discussion of the reasons why the Board's interpretation is appropriate appears in

' As set forth in the Idaho Accountancy Act (Chapter 2, Title 54, Idaho Code), the Board
is the self-governed agency for the State of Idaho that, among other matters, is responsible to
promulgate necessary administrative rules, to initiate or receive complaints against licensees, to
investigate complaints against licensees, and to conduct disciplinary proceedings against
licensees in the state of Idaho.
.004 INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE (RmE 004).
The following documents are hereby incorporated by reference into IDAPA 01.0.01 . . . .
Licensees are required to comply with the following standards when applicable
01. AICPA Standards.

later sections of this brief. This section contains some basic law relating to the interpretation of
administrative rules.
In Mason v. DonnelZy Club, there were two issues raised on appeal. The first
challenged whether the rule in question that had been promulgated by the Department of
Employment was enforceable. That issue has not been raised here. Therefore, only the second
issue, the interpretation of the rule, is relevant.
In interpreting the rule in question, which involved the payment of unemployment

benefits, this Court found that the interpretation of the rule regarding the meaning of "short time"
which was adopted by the Department of Labor was a reasonable interpretation of the rule. In so
doing, the court held as follows:
Administrative regulations are subject to the same
principles of statutory construction as statutes. Rhoades v.
Industrial Commission, 125 Idaho 139, 142, 868 P.2d 467,470
(1993). Interpretation of such a rule should begin, therefore, with
an examination of the literal words of the rule. Thomas v.
Worthington, 132 Idaho 825,829,979 P.2d 1183,1187 (1999)
(citing State ex rel. Lisby v. Lisby, 126 Idaho 776,779,890 P.2d
727,730 (1995). The language of the rule, like the language of a
statute, should be given its plain, obvious and rational meaning. Id.
In addition, this language should be construed in the context of the
rule and statute as a whole, to give effect to the rule and to the
statutory language the rule is meant to supplement. Grand Canyon
Dories v. Idaho State Tax Com 'n, 124 Idaho 1, 5, 855 P.2d 462,
466 (1993).

Mason v. DonnelZy Club, 21 P.3d 903,908,135 Idaho 581 (2001).
Applying that reasoning to the present case, this AICPA rule as incorporated into
the Idaho Accountancy Rules bas the basic intent to require accountants to examine theit

professional relationship to avoid conflicts of interest. The plain, obvious and rational meaning
of the phrase "the relationship is disclosed to and consent is obtained from such client" is that it
is the professional making the disclosure and obtaining the consent.
Furthermore, there is a long line of Idaho cases upholding "the administrative law
canon that great weight should be given to an agency's interpretation of its own rules. Angstman
v. City ofBoise, 917 P.2d 409, 128 Idaho 575,578 (Ct. App. 1996); S. Fork Coal. v. Bd. of

Comm 'rs of Bonneville County, 117 Idaho 857,792 P.2d 882 (1990). The Court should uphold
the interpretation of the Idaho State Board of Accountancy in requiring Mr. Duncan to give
notice of the relationship and hence conflict or to withdraw and receive consent to continue his
representation, none of which he did.
The Appellant cites the case of Preston v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 131 Idaho
502,504,960 P.2d 185,187 (1998), for the proposition that this Court need only give deference
to an agency's construction of a rule if the agency's interpretation is reasonable. A closer review
of the Preston case shows that this Court did find the Tax Commission's interpretation to be
reasonable. The statute being interpreted did not even address the taxation issue posed by the
case. Yet the Court held that the Commission's interpretation was reasonable. In the case at bar,
the rule does address the issue in question, and the Board's interpretation should be given
deference.
The court in Preston discusses a four-prong test established first inJR. Simplot
Co. v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 120 Idaho 849, 862, 870 P.2d 1200, 1219 (1991). The
Appellant challenges only the second prong of that list: the reasonableness of the interpretation

of the statute. As will be demonstrated more klly below, the Board's interpretation is eminently
reasonable.
The court in Preston goes on to discuss the five rationales underlying the rule of
deference, which are:
(1) the rationale requiring that a practical interpretation of the
statute exists, (2) the rationale requiring the presumption of
legislative acquiescence, (3) the rationale requiring agency
expertise, (4) the rationale of repose, and (5) the rationale requiring
contemporaneous agency interpretation.
Preston, 131 Idaho 502, 505,820P.2d 185.
As only one of the rationales need be present and the Respondent will show in
this brief that at least (I), (3), and (5) exist, Preston is strong support for the Respondent's
position in this case.
3.

The Board's findings show a violation of 102.3.

Relevant to Mr. Duncan's violation of Rule 102.3, the Board specifically found in
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Order that his action violated the Rule as
follows (Mr.Duncan is referred to in these findings as the "Respondent"):
2.
Respondent had prepared taxes for Complainant and his
wife Evelyn since 2001. Respondent established a personal
relationship with Evelyn in May 2004, but did not make a
disclosure to the Complainant-spouse that he had a conflict of
interest that prevented him from continuing to represent both
parties in tax preparation. He did not seek the consent of either
party to continue such representation. Respondent stated that tax
preparation was completed in a client neutral manner.
3.
Respondent continued to retain responsibility for the filing
ofjoint tax returns for both clients.

Complainant was aware of the personal relationship that
4.
was established between Respondent and Evelyn and was
antagonistic toward both Respondent and Evelyn.

AICPA Rule 102.03 does not create an exception from the
6.
duty to disclose a conflict of interest and seek consent to
continuation of the professional services relationship for the
situation in which the client is aware of the relationship.

Any single act prohibited in the Idaho Accountancy Act
2.
shall be sufficient to justify a suspension, revocation, h e ,
administrative penalty, restriction, reprimand, injunction,
restraining order, conviction, or any other remedy authorized in by
the Idaho Accountancy Act. Evidence of a general course of
conduct shall not be required.
If an individual licensed by the Board of Accountancy
3.
establishes a personal intimate relationship with one spouse and a
relationship of antagonism with the other spouse, one may
reasonably view the relationships to impair the member's
objectivity.
If an individual licensed by the Board of Accountancy
4.
believes the professional service can be performed with
objectivity, and therelationship is disclosed to the client(s) and
consent of the client(s) is obtained, AICPA 102.3 does not prohibit
the performance of the professional service.
Respondent had a duty to terminate the professional
5.
relationship or to make disclosure of a conflict of interest to both
clients due to the divorce proceedings and finalization of the
divorce or the personal relationship that was established between
the Respondent and one client. Respondent did not make such
required disclosures and did not seek the consent of either client
prior to continuation of the professional services relationship.
Respondent violated the Idaho Accountancy Act, Idaho
6.
Code @54-219(l)(d), specifically Idaho Accountancy

Rule 004.01 by not making the disclosures or seekinglreceiving the
consent(s) required by AICPA 102-3.
Finding of Fact 2,3,4, and 6 and Conclusions of Law 2-6.
4.

The Appellant was required to withdraw or disclose his relationship
with Mrs. Forsmann to his client Mr. Forsmann.

Rule 102.3 does not require that a conflict exist, only that the appearance of a
conflict exist. Integrity is a fundamental aspect of the profession. AICPA Art. 111, .01.
"Integrity requires a member to be, among other things, honest and candid within the constraints
of client confidentiality." Id. at .02 (emphasis added). The same article goes on to state,
"Integrity also requires a member to observe the principles of objectivity and independence and
of due care." Id. at .04. Given the importance of integrity and the emphasis on being candid

Article 111-Integrity
To maintain and broaden public confidence, members shouldperform
all professional responsibilities with the highest sense of integrity.

Integrity is an element of character fundamental to
.O1
professional recognition. It is the quality form which the public
trust derives and the benchmark against which a member must
ultimately test all decisions.
.02
Integrity requires a member to be, among other things,
honest and candid within the constraints of client confidentiality.
Service and the public trust should not be subordinated to personal
gain and advantage. Integrity can accommodate the inadvertent
error and the honest difference of opinion; it cannot accommodate
deceit or subordination of principle.

Integrity is measured in terms of what is right and just. In
.03
the absence of specific rules, standards, or guidance, or in the face
of conflicting opinions, a member should test decisions and deeds
by asking: "Am I doing what a person of integrity would do?

and independent as an accountant, the responsibility to properly disclose any conflicts rests with
the accountant. These duties cannot be satisfied merely by a third party gaining knowledge
through others' efforts as Appellant would argue. Appellant attempts to take a very narrow
reading of the Rule and, in effect, by so doing significantly weakens the Rule. Appellant argues
that Rule 102.3 is silent on who must disclose the relationship and how the relationship must be
disclosed; when, in actuality, the rule states who must make the disclosure and, further, that the
disclosure cannot be a mere discovery of the relationship by happenstance. It is noteworthy that
Appellant concedes that a conflict of interest arose out of the relationship that developed between
Appellant and Evelyn Forsmann in late May of 2004, before the filing of the 2003 tax return as
will be developed more fully later.
More specifically, Rule 102.3 states that when a conflict situation arises out of a
relationship with another person and the accountant chooses not to withdraw, such a conflict
situation can be avoided only if two things occur: first, the accountant must determine whether
he or she can represent the client objectively; and second, the relationship must be disclosed

and consent obtained from the client. From the unambiguous language of the Rule, the

E w e I retained my integrity?" Integrity requires a member to
observe both the form and the spirit of technical and ethical
standards; circumvention of those standards constitutes
subordination of judgment.
Integrity also requires a member to observe the principles
of objectivity and independence and of due care.

.04

AICPA 111, .01, .02, .03, and .04.

imposition of the duty to disclose the conflict and obtain the consent is clearly on the accountant,
considering the following:
1.

The Rules are directed to accountants.

2.

The accountant must take the first step to determine if he or she can

perform his or her services objectively. No one else can make that determination.
3.

In the same sentence in which the accountant's determination of

objectivity is described, an obligation is imposed that "the relationship is disclosed to and
consent is obtained from such client. (Emphasis added.)
4.

Only the accountant has the relationship of client with the person to whom

disclosure must be made and consent obtained. Furthermore, the use of the prepositions to and
from indicate not only the source of the information but the receiver of the information.
5.

The terms used in the Rule are that the relationship is "disclosed to" the

client, not "found out by" the client and consent is "obtained from" not "inferred from" the
client's actions.
6.

The last sentence of Rule 102.3 states, "when making the disclosure, the

member should consider Rule 301."7 (emphasis added). The last line explicitly imposes a duty to
actively make the disclosure of the conflict to the client on the accountant as it refers to his or her
duty "when making the disclosure." Therefore, contrary to Appellant's position, Rule 102.3
does state who needs to disclose the relationship-the

accountant.

Rule 301 relates to disclosure of the client's confidential financial information.

7.

Finally, the Appellant would have this Court believe that an accountant

with a conflict could avoid any mention of the conflict, trust that it would eventually be known
and continue to work for a client and then claim consent through acquiescence. This do nothing
approach to ethics is exactly what accountancy regulations are trying to avoid in the post-Enron
environment. Furthermore, this interpretation would in effect nullify the rule in question. A
standard used in interpreting statutes and ruless is that the court should give the statute (or rule) a
meaning that will not in effect nullify it. Walker v. Nationwide Fin. Corp. ofIdaho, 629 P.2d
662,102 Idaho 266,268 (1981).
5.

Appellant failed to obtain consent from the Complainant to continue
in the representation.

Appellant contends that AICPA 102.3 does not state how consent must be
obtained. He further argues that because Complainant signed the return, and filed a tax return
prepared by Appellant, that he had received consent for the conflict of interest. He claims that
when proper consent is obtained, the consenting party waives its right to object to the conflict.
Idaho case law is clear: "a waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right"
and "the party asserting the waiver 'must show that he acted in reasonable reliance upon it and
that he thereby has altered his position to his detriment."' Fullerton v. Griswold, 142 Idaho 820,
824, 136 P.3d 291,295 (2006) (quoting Margaret H. Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 123 Idaho 253,256,
846 P.2d 904,907 (1993)) (emphasis added).

Administrative regulations are subject to the same principles of statutory construction as
statutes. Mason v. Donnelly Club, 21 P.3d 903, 135 Idaho 581 (2001).

In this case, Appellant argues that Complainant's signing, filing, and receiving the
benefits of the tax return constitute an implied consent to the Appellant's continued
representation of him and therefore an implicit waiver of the conflict of interest. However, such
actions do not demonstrate that Complainant "voluntarily, intentionally relinquished a known
right." Appellant had an affirmative duty under Rule 102.3 to disclose the conflict and then
obtain the client's consent to continue in his representation. Part of the disclosure would
necessarily require a disclosure of the conflict, and the client's right to take his business
elsewhere. The client cannot be expected to know the accountant's rules of ethics or conflicts.
Appellant did not discuss with Complainant any conflicting relationship, rather Appellant sat
idly by and allowed Complainant to believe that his relationship with his accountant was
unchanged at the same time (April-July) that his wife was having a personal relationship with
that accountant. Consent requires a knowing act that foregoes a right. This did not occur,
therefore consent, either implied or express, was not obtained as required by Rule 102.3.
The Appellant concentrates his arguments regarding disclosure of the conflict on
the period of time in August and September 2004. However, the conflict existed long before that
and Mr. Duncan acknowledged as much. The following testimony appears on pages 8 and 9 of
the transcript:
Hunter:

And why did you suspend the services on April 28,
2004?

Duncan:

Oh I didn't, that was the last work that was done,
and somewhere between that time I was notified
Evelyn was going to seek a divorce. And I knew
that that was a conflict, an automatic conflict. I had

a choice at that point to either stop work or to call
Randy and say, Oh, by the way, your wife was
going to seek a divorce. I didn't believe it was my
place to call Randy, so I stopped work.
Hunter:

Well there was another choice, wasn't there? You
did not have to tell him the source of your conflict.
You could have just called him on May 4, after she
called you, and said, I'm not going to be your
accountant any more. You didn't have to disclose
why, did you?

Duncan:

No, I did not have to disclose why.

Hunter:

But this suspension that you made on this account,
you never advised Mr. Forsmannn [sic] that you
were suspending work on the account, did you?

Duncan:

No we did not.

Hunter:

And you didn't call him and tell him there was a
conflict.

Duncan:

No I did not.

Hunter:

But you recognized that there was a conflict as soon
as Mrs. Forsmann called you and asked you for
advice about [inaudible]?

Duncan:

Yes, I did recognize there was a conflict.

When he recognized the conflict Mr. Duncan felt his only alternative was to stop
working on the file since he did not want to disclose to Mr. Forsmann that he had been consulted
about a divorce lawyer. However, in the hearing he recognized that he could have terminated the
relationship without disclosing the reason (which he eventually did on August 13,2004--see
Transcript p. 16). He also admits that he did not advise Mr. Forsmann that he was terminating
the relationship, nor that there was a conflict that he admits existed.

Appellant's defense is that Mr. Forsmann "knew of the conflict" and, therefore,
he did not have to notify him. However, Mr. Forsmann was not self-informed of the conflict in
May 2004, since the divorce complaint was not filed until the end of June (see Transcript p. 11).

By that time Mr. Duncan's relationship had gone beyond merely being aslced for a referral, as
disclosed in the following testimony from pages 11-12 and 14-15 of the transcript,
Hunter:

Would you please describe your relationship with
Evelyn Forsmann from May, when she called you,
though [sic] the time that the divorce was filed.
And by that I mean, tell me what kind of contacts
you had with her and the nature of that contact.

Duncan:

I had contact with her by phone. I had contact with
her when she came over to my residence with her
children and her friends. All of that contact
between would have been basically personal
relationship.

Hunter:

She called you often, didn't she?

Duncan:

Yes she did.

Duncan:

I do not deny that she called me.

Hunter:

And she called you often, at your office.

Duncan:

I don't remember how often she called me at the
office.

Hunter:

There are 67 telephone calls to your office during
that period of time. And so at least some of those
would be to you.

Duncan:

I have no doubt that [inaudible].

Hunter:

And there are 510 cell phone calls, calls to your cell
phone, during this three-and-a-half month period.
Those would be to you. No one else answered your
cell phone.

Duncan:

No one else answered my cell phone.

Hunter:

So, 510 cell phone calls in a period of May, June,
July and half of August, was approximately 100
days; so that averages out to about five to six
telephone calls a day &om Mrs. Forsmann. Does
that sound about right?

Duncan:

It doesn't sound right, but you have the records.

Hunter:

If that's what the records show then you would
agree that-she did call you a lot.

Duncan:

Yes, she did call me a lot.

Hunter:

Now looking at Exhibit 2, please . . . it would
appear that the, on August 11 a second extension
entry was made by your secretary.

Duncan:

That is correct.

Hunter:

And that's under your supervision?

Duncan:

Yes. She would have brought me a list of
August 15 deadlines and said, What are we going to
do with these.

To summarize: as of the end of April or early May Mr. Duncan had a conflict of
interest that he recognized existed because Mrs. Forsmann disclosed she was looking for a
divorce attorney and asked him for a recommendation. At that time he claims to have
"suspended activity on the file," but actually any work necessary to prepare the return and the
request for an extension had been completed by that time and he did not disclose the conflict.

A second conflict arose in May and June. He developed a "personal relationship"
with Mrs. Forsmann. That second conflict was not disclosed. Mr. Forsmann eventually became
aware of that conflict at least by mid-August when the divorce was final on the 1lth or when he
lefi a message at the Duncan office on the 18th. On the 13th of August, Duncan told Forsmann
that he would no longer be doing his accounting. However, the force of that withdrawal is
mitigated by the fact that a second extension was filed on or about August 15 by Solomon &
Duncan acting on behalf of their clients, the Forsmanns, and by the fact that they did the couple's
taxes in September.
Mr. Duncan could have and should have terminated the clientlaccountant
relationship in May, or in June or July, but he did not. He could have disclosed the conflict and
sought a waiver, but he did not. A "suspension of activity" on the file without disclosure to the
client is not one of the options of Rule 102.3. That is the gist of the Board's Conclusions of Law
Nos. 5 and 6 and it is supported by the Appellant's own testimony. Because the Board relied on
the language of the Rule coupled with the evidence presented, the Board's conclusion that
Appellant failed to properly obtain consent from his clients is supported by substantial evidence
and is neither arbitrary, capricious nor an abuse of discretion.

6.

Appellant's conduct is expressly defined as a conflict of interest in the
comments to AICPA Rule 102.3.

Despite Appellant's posturing that no conflict existed that needed to be disclosed,
several examples are set forth in Rule 102.3 indicating situations which could be viewed as

impairing a member's objectivity. One example, which the Board also relied upon, states as
follows:
A member has provided tax or personal financial planning (PFP)
services for a married couple who are undergoing a divorce, and
the member has been asked to provide services for both parties
during the divorce proceedings.
AICPA RULE102.3, cmts. The above example is exactly the situation that faced Appellant.
Appellant argues that Rule 102.3 does not apply to tax preparation. Such a distinction is curious
because tax preparation is a tax service that is covered by the above comment to Rule 102.3. The
term "services" within the comment modifies both tax and personal financial planning (PFP),
which are two distinct services, not a single service. The language of the comment contemplates
both tax services, which includes tax preparation and personal financial planning services.
Despite Appellant's attempt to parse the language "tax services" into financial or tax planning
advice, any distinction is a distinction without a difference. This argument is also undermined
by the fact that Mr. Duncan admits in his testimony at pages 8 and 9 of the Transcript that he
knew there was a conflict of interest on his part as soon as Mrs. Forsmann talked to him about
getting a divorce.
The fact that the tax events in question could not be changed or were not changed
is irrelevant to the inquiry of whether Appellant acted inappropriately in failing to disclose a
conflict of interest or withdraw and the ensuing discipline by the Board. Further, that the tax
work was substantially completed when the conflict arose is irrelevant to the inquiry because the
Rule is clear, that once a conflict arises, regardless of the stage in the tax work, the conflict must

be disclosed by the accountant and consent of the client obtained in order to continue the
representation of the client. See AICPA RULE102.3.

7.

The relationship Appellant had with his client is a conflict of interest
that must 6e disclosed pursuant to AlCPA Rule 102.3.

Mr. Duncan does not contend that he disclosed the relationship. In fact, he admits
that he did not. (Transcript pp. 8-9.) Because the Board relied on the language of the Rule
coupled with the evidence that has been conceded, its conclusion that Appellant's failure to
disclose the relationship was a violation of the accounting standards was supported by substantial
evidence. Furthermore, the decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion
because it was based on the language of the Rule, as well as common sense. If a licensed
accountant begins an affair with a married woman and that woman and her husband are and have
been clients of the accountant and his firm, the obligation on the accountant to take some
affirmative action is obvious.
Appellant also argues that AICPA Rule 102.3 does not require the disclosure of
the conflict, only the relationship. However, the two terms are one and the same. The Rule
requires the consideration of a conflict and the disclosure of that conflict, the conflict being the
inappropriate relationship. Any distinction is a distinction without a difference. Ultimately,
Appellant had a duty to properly disclose his relationships that may be objectionable by a client
pursuant to Rule 102.3. In this case, no relationship was disclosed by Appellant, nor was consent
to continue in the representation properly obtained. As such, any failure to properly disclose the

relationships that constituted the conflict of interest, and obtain consent, is a violation of the
Rules-as

the Board found.
It should also be emphasized that the Appellant's argument that "the relationship"

was known to the Complainant is not true for the months of May, June, and part or all of July.
During those months when the first conflict (Duncan's knowledge of Mrs. Forsmann seeking a
divorce) and the second conflict (the development of the "personal relationship") arose,

Mr. Forsmann was not knowledgeable of the relationship. Duncan recognized the conflict, but
he neither withdrew nor disclosed the relationship and asked for a consent to continue.

IV.
COSTS AND FEES
The Respondent Board of Accountancy has incurred costs and fees in defending
against the Petition for Judicial Relief and this Appeal. The Board not only acted appropriately,
but leniently in this matter. The Appellant's position is undermined by the undisputed facts and
his own testimony that during a five-month period in 2004, he went from being a confidant to
being a "personal friend" of Evelyn Forsmann, his client, and the wife of his client Randy
Forsmann. During that time his firm was the accountant of record for the Forsmanns and he was
the partner in charge of the account. He failed to withdraw and he failed to disclose the
relationship and ask for a consent of the clients to continue the relationship. He presents no
excuse for his failure to act in May, June and July, except that he "suspended activity on the
file," which is not an alternative under AICPA Rule 102.3. This petition was brought

frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation and attorneys fees are awardable under Idaho
Code Section 12-121 and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(l).

v.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons described above, Respondent respectfully requests that the Court
uphold the Idaho State Board of Accountant's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final
Order and that it award the Respondent its costs and fees incurred in responding to the Petition
and the Motion to Dismiss.
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